ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις

WikiLeaks Document Release

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

February 2, 2009

Congressional Research Service

Report 97-799

Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues – Background and Recent

Developments

Carol Migdalovitz, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

August 21, 1997

Abstract.

have produced crises and even brought them to the brink of war. One series of disputes involves the Aegean Sea

borders. The two disagree over the border in the air, continental shelf, and territorial sea, over the status of

islands in the Sea, and over the ownership of Aegean islets.

For many years, NATO allies Greece and Turkey have been adversaries in bilateral disputes which

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

Congressional Research Service ˜

The Library of Congress

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

97-799 F

Greece and Turkey:

Aegean Issues — Background and

Recent Developments

August 21, 1997

Carol Migdalovitz

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues — Background and

Recent Developments

Summary

For many years, NATO allies Greece and Turkey have been adversaries in

bilateral disputes which have produced crises and even brought them to the brink of

war. One series of disputes involves Aegean Sea borders. The two disagree over the

border in the air, continental shelf, and territorial sea, over the status of islands in the

Sea, and over the ownership of Aegean islets.

In the aftermath of a January 1996 crisis over the sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak

islet, various dispute resolution initiatives were undertaken. NATO proposed

military-related confidence-building measures, some of which are being

implemented. The President of the European Union Council of Ministers proposed

a committee of wise men, which was accepted in the form of Greek and Turkish

committees of experts who are exchanging views via the President. In March 1996,

Turkey suggested ways to address Aegean issues. A year later, Greece made a

decisive overture that accelerated bilateral diplomacy. Finally, in July 1997, the

United States instigated a joint Greek-Turkish declaration of principles that is said

to equal a non-aggression pact. The principles have yet to be applied to specific

Aegean disputes.

Whether or not Greece and Turkey want to change the nature of their relations

and resolve the Aegean disputes is uncertain. Strong motivations to resolve exist.

Greece wants to meet the criteria for joining the European Monetary Union and must

control defense spending to do so. It can only cut defense spending if the “Turkish

threat” recedes. Greece also wants to cultivate a more positive image in European

circles and its relations with Turkey are an impediment. Turkish secularists want to

be part of Europe and to stop Greek use of the veto in the European Union as a

weapon in bilateral disputes. The influential Turkish military may favor a

rapprochement with Athens. In both countries, however, there may be domestic

political constraints on policy change. In Greece, the legacy of former Prime

Minister Andreas Papandreou, who asserted that Turkey is the greatest threat to

Greece, affects the current government’s maneuverability. In Turkey, nationalist

former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit is now Deputy Prime Minister and the

government’s primary foreign policy spokesman, and there is no new thinking in

Ankara to match that of Athens.

The United States wants stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and, after the

Imia/Kardak crisis, sought to become more active in dispute resolution. U.S.

neutrality in the crisis, however, was perceived in Greece as favoritism toward

Turkey and prevented the United States from engaging immediately. The U.S. desire

to be a force for positive change persevered and reached fruition with the Madrid

declaration in July 1997. The United States is determined to stay on course and work

with the parties to apply the Madrid principles to specific disputes.

The prospects for Aegean resolutions are better now than they have been in

years, but domestic political developments in both Greece and Turkey could affect

the outlook detrimentally.

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Aegean Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Continental Shelf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Territorial Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Islets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Dispute Resolution Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Bilateral Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The Madrid Declaration — U.S. Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Motivations for Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Constraints on Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

1

1996, by Carol Migdalovitz.

See CRS Report 96-140, Greece and Turkey: the Rocky Islet Crisis, Updated March 7,

2

Negotiations

The subject of a separate CRS product: Issue Brief 89140, Cyprus: Status of U.N., by Carol Migdalovitz, updated regularly.

Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues —

Background and Recent Developments

Introduction

The United States and NATO look to Greece and Turkey to anchor stability in

the Eastern Mediterranean, a region bordering the unsettled Balkans and Middle East.

Often, however, the two allies are antagonists in bilateral disputes which have a

troubling incendiary potential. Since a January 1996 crisis over an islet in the

Aegean Sea took the neighbors to the brink of war,

improve Greek-Turkish relations. Other divisive issues, notably those concerning

Cyprus,

community in Turkey, Muslim (mainly Turkish) citizens of Greek Thrace, the Kurds,

and the competition for regional allies, sometimes complicate the search for a

reasonable accommodation. Aside from Cyprus, however, these other issues are not

crisis-prone nor the subject of current diplomacy.

1 efforts have been made to2 the Ecumenical (Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate and Greek Orthodox

The Aegean Issues

The longest border between Greece and Turkey is in the Aegean Sea and has

been disputed in the air, in the sea, in the continental shelf, and on islands, islets, and

rocks.

Air

Since 1931, Greece has claimed airspace extending to 10 miles over the Aegean.

A country’s airspace rights usually coincide with its territorial sea rights. Greece

claims a six-mile sea limit. Therefore, other countries, including the United States,

recognize Greek airspace as only six miles. Turkish military aircraft challenge

Greece’s airspace claim by flying to within six miles of Greek islands. Greece

immediately accuses Turkey of airspace violations and scrambles its planes to

intercept the Turks. Continuous mock, and potentially dangerous “dogfights” ensue,

sometimes resulting in plane crashes.

Air traffic control issues parallel the airspace dispute. In 1952, the International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) assigned Greece air traffic control for the

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-2

Aegean Flight Information Region (FIR), i.e., international and Greek domestic

airspace over the Aegean up to Turkish national airspace. After the Cyprus crisis of

1974, Turkey required all planes approaching its airspace to report after reaching the

Aegean median line in order to enable military radar to distinguish innocent flights

from aggressors. Greece said that this impinged on its FIR authority and abrogated

responsibility for air safety over the Aegean. International airlines reacted by ceasing

direct flights between Greece and Turkey. Closure of the Aegean detrimentally

affected commercial air flights over the Sea to other areas. The situation was

resolved in 1980, when the pre-1974 status quo was restored and international flights

resumed over the Aegean. In general, Turkey claims that FIR is a technical issue that

Greece interprets and exploits as a matter of sovereignty to restrict Turkish aircraft

and exercises over the Aegean.

Continental Shelf

The dispute over the definition of the continental shelf involves maritime

resources as well as sovereignty. Turkey claims that the continental shelf under the

Aegean is an extension of its Anatolian or Asia Minor land mass and that the

continental shelf border is a median line between the two mainland coasts. Greece

claims that islands have continental shelves and that the continental shelf border is

a median line between the Turkish coast and eastern Greek islands, which fringe the

Turkish mainland. In support of its position, Greece cites a 1958 United Nations

Convention on the Continental Shelf and the more recent U.N. Convention on the

Law of the Sea, which recognize that islands generate continental shelves. Greece

is a signatory of both Conventions, but Turkey is not and rejects Greece’s claim as

fundamentally inequitable.

The continental shelf dispute has provoked two crises. In November 1973,

Turkey granted oil exploration rights in what it called international waters in the

Aegean, adjacent to several Greek islands. In February 1974, Greece protested that

the area was part of its continental shelf. That May, the Turkish government sent a

research vessel into the area, with an escort of 32 warships. At a May 1975 summit

of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, Turkey appeared to agree to submit the

dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Governmental instability in

Ankara, however, rendered the apparent accord obsolete and Turkey sent in another

research vessel accompanied by a warship. Greece appealed to the U.N. Security

Council to address Turkey’s violations of its sovereignty and unilaterally petitioned

the ICJ for a determination of continental shelf rights. The U.N. Security Council

passed an ambiguously worded Resolution 395 (1976), calling for both direct

negotiations and judicial recourse. The ICJ rejected Greece’s request for interim

measures, what U.S. courts would call a temporary injunction, because of Greece’s

failure to show irreparable harm. It also declined jurisdiction, which depends on the

consent of both parties to a dispute.

The second crisis occurred in 1987, when Greece granted oil exploration rights

in the continental shelf near its island of Thasos and Turkey granted similar rights in

waters near the Greek island of Samothrace. A Turkish ship went to work, with a far

smaller naval escort than in the 1970s. Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou

threatened to take all necessary measures to protect Greece’s sovereignty. The crisis

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-3

abated after intense NATO and U.S. mediation, with each country assuring the other

that exploration would only occur in its own, undisputed territorial waters.

Greece proposes that both countries jointly petition the ICJ for a determination

of continental shelf limits. The demarcation of the continental shelf is the only

Aegean dispute for which Greece is willing to petition the Court jointly with Turkey

for a resolution and accept an arbitral compromise. On all other Aegean issues,

Greece maintains that Turkey must initiate a petition for legal recourse because it is

disputing established Greek sovereign rights.

Territorial Sea

In 1936, Greece claimed a territorial sea of six nautical miles. It reserved the

right to claim a 12-nautical-mile limit — a right later codified in the U.N.

Convention on the Law of the Sea which the Greek parliament ratified in May 1995.

As noted above, Turkey is not a signatory of the Convention. In response to the

Greek parliament’s action, on June 8, 1995, the Turkish parliament gave its

government authority to take all necessary measures, including military ones, if

Greece exercised the right to 12 miles and increased its territorial waters. Greece has

never affirmatively exercised the right to 12 miles. If Greece claims 12 miles, then

it would claim over two-thirds of the Aegean Sea. On June 12, 1974, in the context

of the continental shelf dispute (above), Turkey had formally declared for the first

time that an extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles would

constitute a

times, contending that a Greek territorial sea of 12 nautical miles would “strangle”

Turkey and transform the Aegean into a “Greek lake.” Turkey believes that Greek

control of the Aegean could threaten its access to international waters. Over twothirds

of Turkey’s commercial traffic transits the Sea. Greece says that it would

ensure other countries’ rights of innocent passage.

casus belli (cause of war). Turkish officials reiterated this position many

Islands

There are about 2,400 islands in the Aegean; almost all are Greek and about 100

are inhabited. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne mandated the demilitarization of several

islands then given to Greece in the eastern Aegean. Italy ceded the Dodecanese

Islands to Greece by the Treaty of Paris in 1947, which required their demilitarization

as well. Greece began militarizing eastern Aegean islands in 1960, and accelerated

the program after the Cyprus crisis of 1974. Greece’s militarization of Lemnos and

Samothrace, at the entrance to the Straits of the Dardanelles, is of great concern to

Turkey. Greece militarized the Dodecanese for “self-defense” after 1974. Turkey

contends that Greece’s actions violate the Lausanne and Paris Treaties. Greece

argues that the relevant provisions of Lausanne were superseded in 1936, with the

Montreux Convention of 1936, which authorized Turkey to militarize and control

military traffic through the Straits. Greece also claims that its actions are defensive.

After the fact, in 1975, Turkey established its Fourth Army based in Izmir on the

Aegean coast. The Fourth Army has an amphibious landing force capable, in theory,

of seizing Greek islands. Greece says that the Fourth Army must be redeployed

before it reduces its military presence around Turkey. The respective Greek and

Turkish positions, however, may be more political irritation than military threat.

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-4

3

See, CRS Report 96-140, Greece and Turkey: the Rocky Islet Crisis, cited above.

When Turks complain about the militarized Greek islands, some Greeks raise

the fate of two previously predominantly Greek-inhabited islands, Imvros (Gokceada)

and Tenedos (Bozcaada), in the northern Aegean near the entrance to the Straits that

the Treaty of Lausanne granted to Turkey. The Treaty required Turkey to guarantee

non-Muslim persons and property. According to Greece, Turkey’s discriminatory

and confiscatory policies instead forced most Greeks to leave.

Islets

Sovereignty over Aegean islets and rocks was not in dispute until December

1995, when a Turkish merchant captain refused to have his vessel rescued by a

Greece ship near an uninhabited islet (Imia to Greece, Kardak to Turkey) that he said

was Turkish.

and military involvement. The parties returned to status quo ante after U.S.

intercession. Subsequently, a Turkish naval officer appeared to question Greek

sovereignty of the island of Gavdos, near Crete, at a NATO planning session.

Although the Turkish Foreign Ministry said that Gavdos was a technical not a

political question, Turkish officials began to refer to “grey areas,” i.e., islets and

rocks, not specifically mentioned in treaties, whose sovereignty may be unresolved.

They later said that there were 130 such islets and rocks. Greece demanded that

Turkey deny it had claims to Gavdos.

3 Both countries’ media exploited the situation, prompting government

Dispute Resolution Initiatives

Since the Imia/Kardak crisis, several initiatives have been undertaken to resolve

the Aegean disputes.

NATO

Soon after the crisis, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana proposed

confidence-building measures (CBMs) based on a May 1988 Memorandum of

Understanding between Karolos Papoulias and Mesut Yilmaz, the Greek and Turkish

Foreign Ministers, respectively. In the Memorandum, Turkey and Greece agreed that

to

1) respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other and their

rights to use the high seas and international airspace of the Aegean;

2) avoid interfering with shipping and air traffic while conducting military

activities in the high seas and international airspace; and

3) avoid conducting military exercises in the high seas and international

airspace during the peak tourism period of July 1- September 1 and main

national and religious holidays.

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-5

4

Defense Department briefing, May 15, 1997. Reuters.

In September 1988, Papoulias and Yilmaz signed Guidelines for the Prevention of

Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace, which called,

inter alia, for the parties to act in conformity with international regulations.

Solana renewed his CBM effort in February 1997. His proposals, strongly

supported by the United States, called for

1) a moratorium on military exercises between June 15-September 15;

2) combat training missions only by unarmed planes;

3) planes to use identification, friend or foe devices (IFF) (instead of

submitting flight plans) to preclude intercepts, reduce the need to scramble

interceptors, and decrease the number of mock dog fights;

4) direct communication between Greek and Turkish air defense operations

offices; and

5) establishment of a center at NATO Command Headquarters in Naples

to monitor Aegean airspace operations.

4

Turkey agreed to the proposals, with modifications. Greece agreed to the moratorium

on military exercises for the proposed period, while Turkey agreed to July 1-August

15 and said it would use IFF during that time. As it has done for decades, Greece

rejected use of IFF because it carved out a special exception to the Athens FIR, which

it said applies to all countries. Turkey called for an exchange of information

concerning flights in the Aegean, which Greece also considered an infringement of

its FIR responsibilities. Greece refused to disarm its combat aircraft in its national

airspace, but said that training flights would not be armed. Greece reportedly agreed

to hotlines between Athens and NATO and Turkey and NATO. Beginning in

February 1997, the two sides began a test program of sending pictures of Aegean

activity to NATO headquarters in Naples.

European Union

During its 1997 turn as President of the European Union Council of Ministers,

the Netherlands proposed a committee of “wise men” to deal with Greek-Turkish

Aegean issues. Greece did not want either a direct dialogue with Turkey that might

be perceived as a willingness to negotiate what it views as its non-negotiable

sovereignty issues or the involvement of third parties. It counterproposed the

creation of separate Greek and Turkish committees of non-governmental experts who

would report to the Dutch Presidency, which then would evaluate the reports for

common ground. Turkey accepted the Dutch proposal and the Greek

counterproposal. After 32 deputies of the ruling Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement

(PASOK) voiced opposition to a Greek-Turkish dialogue in any form, the Greek

government explained that the committees’ conclusions would be technical and

procedural, not political or binding. The experts handed in reports to the Dutch to

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-6

5

Turkish Embassy press release, March 24, 1996.

6

p. 1.

Greece: Nation “Shocked’ by Turkey’s Aegean Claims. The European. April 4-10, 1996,

7

Greek foreign minister anxious about Turkish invasion. Reuters, May 8, 1996.

8

March 21, 1997.

Pangalos on Turkish-Greek Ties, Yeni Yuzyil, March 21, 1997, translated by FBIS online,

give to the other party for comment. The Dutch wanted the experts to meet; Turkey

agreed, but Greece refused. The Dutch Presidency handed an incomplete mission

over to Luxembourg at the end of its tenure. After exchanges of comments via the

Presidency, Greek officials accepted that a meeting could take place in the fall.

Bilateral Diplomacy

On March 24, 1996, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz offered to enter into

negotiations with Greece without preconditions with a view to settling all Aegean

issues as a whole on the basis of respect for international law and agreements

establishing the status quo in the Aegean. The proposal included talks on a political

framework agreement, agreement on military-related confidence-building measures,

avoidance of unilateral steps and actions that could increase tension, and a

comprehensive process of peaceful settlement, including third party arbitration.

5

Yilmaz made his offer too soon after the Imia/Kardak crisis for Greek

sensitivities. The Greeks were not yet ready to advance and initially said that they

found the proposal lacking a commitment. Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos

later welcomed Yilmaz’s suggestions as “a great improvement,” but proposed a step

by step solution instead. He said, “We should create a joint committee to discuss the

agreement in legal terms. Next, we can revive the committees on good

neighborliness to promote cooperation in mutually beneficial areas: trade, tourism

and anti-drug smuggling. Once we reach that level, it might facilitate a mutual

slackening of the two countries’ military presence in the Aegean.”

1996, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers agreed to have their Ministries’

experts meet in Switzerland. For domestic consumption, Pangalos underscored that

“there is no organized dialogue or negotiations.” Pangalos later expressed concern

that his Turkish counterpart at the time, Emre Gonensay, had spoken of “grey areas,”

disputing Greece’s ownership of other islets or rocks.

Pangalos-Gonensay meeting because of what it termed Turkey’s “provocations,” i.e.,

incidents wherein Turkey appeared to question Greece’s sea and airspace rights, as

well as governmental instability in Ankara. Greece called on Turkey to implement

the Papoulias-Yilmaz measures.

On March 6, 1997, Foreign Minister Pangalos, prodded by U.S. officials to

make a positive gesture toward Ankara, said in Washington that “Turkey certainly

belongs to Europe.” He amplified the point to a Turkish journalist on March 21,

“Turkey’s ultimate objective must be to integrate with Europe. Greece definitely

wants it to do so.”

conditions for improved relations and for Greece to lift its veto on about U.S.$475

million in European Union aid to Turkey that had been promised as part of a March

6 On April 26,7 Greece canceled a June 19968 Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Foreign Minister Pangalos set

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-7

9

Greece Press Releases, April 4 and 24, 1997.

Greece threatens to veto Turkey customs union aid, Reuters, March 21, 1996; Embassy of

10

3, 4, translated by FBIS, May 5, 1997.

Nikos Marakis, Pangalos-Ciller Istanbul Meeting, To Vima Tis Kiriakis, May 4, 1997, p.

11

Athens TV Interviews Turkish President. English text: FBIS online, May 27, 1997.

1995 EU-Turkish customs union accord. The Greek officials demanded that Turkey

renounce violence, i.e., retract its threat of war if Athens extends its territorial waters

to 12 nautical miles, even though Greece did not intend to exercise its right

immediately; accept borders delineated by international treaties, although matters

pertaining to interpretation and implementation of this framework could be

discussed; and recognize the ICJ as a judicial mechanism with jurisdiction for settling

of bilateral disputes. To assuage domestic critics, government officials insisted that

Greece would not engage in overall negotiations leading to a redelineation of

borders.

9

In April 1997, the Greek and Turkish deputy foreign ministers and foreign

ministers had more cordial contacts than previously, which prepared for the EU

experts committees (above) and the Madrid declaration (below). Then Turkish

Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller may have been especially encouraging, saying that

Ankara does not want a change in the Aegean status quo. One Greek analyst

interpreted this as Turkey abandoning a demand that the Aegean regime be reviewed,

saying it can live with the current situation, and that war was not among the measures

to resolve Greek-Turkish differences. In response, Pangalos acknowledged a new

“spirit of understanding.”

10

Finally, in a May 19 interview with Greek television, Turkish President

Suleyman Demirel said he could agree to a non-aggression pact with Greece.

June 5, Pangalos said that Greece likewise was ready to sign a non-aggression pact

with Turkey.

11 On

The Madrid Declaration — U.S. Diplomacy

On July 8, 1997, at the NATO summit in Madrid, U.S. Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright invited Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos and his new Turkish

counterpart Ismail Cem to agree on six principles to govern bilateral relations. Prime

Minister Simitis and President Demirel then endorsed the principles, which Simitis

said amount to a non-aggression pact. Assistant Secretary of State for European

Affairs John Kornblum and his team worked to achieve the accord. The principles

provide for

1) mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing development

of good-neighborly relations;

2) respect for each other’s sovereignty;

3) respect for the principles of international law and international

agreements;

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-8

12

A little EMU enlightenment, The Economist, February 22, 1997, p. 88.

13

Control and Disarmament Agency,

edition, http://www.acda.gov/wmeat96/w96tbl1.pdf.

In 1995, Greece spent 5.5% of its GDP on defense, while Turkey spent 4.0%. U.S. ArmsWorld Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, online

4) respect for each other’s legitimate vital interests and concerns in the

Aegean;

5) a commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual

respect and a willingness to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding;

6) a commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual

consent and without use of force or threat of force.

The final two provisions may have the greatest potential to deter conflict

because they address matters that have been most provocative. Greece is committed

to refrain from unilateral acts — which may include the exercise of its right to a 12-

nautical mile territorial sea, while Turkey promises not to use force, eliminating the

casus belli

the hard task will be in their application.

. The principles do not address or resolve specific Aegean disputes and

Motivations for Change

Both countries have become motivated to improve bilateral relations by external

influences that could benefit their internal development. The European Union

appears to be the primary force for change.

Greece

In contrast to recent governments in Athens, the Simitis government has a

distinctly Eurocentric outlook and wants to meet the European Union criteria for

joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) and to increase its competitiveness

with European countries which meet the criteria before Greece. Those criteria

include a budget deficit of not more than 3% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and

a government debt of not more than 60% of GDP. For 1997, Greece’s budget deficit

is expected to be 6.2% of GDP and its government debt is forecast at 108% of GDP.

12

Among EU member states, Greece spends the highest proportion of its GDP on

defense,

them under control, Greece must cut military spending. No Greek government,

however, can make such cuts without also diminishing the “Turkish threat” which

propels the expenditures. In the wake of the Imia/Kardak crisis, in June 1996, even

the Simitis government, otherwise fiscally conservative, announced a new multibillion

dollar arms program. Nonetheless, largely because of their European

orientation, Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Pangalos are likely to

persist in their outreach to Turkey, knowing that a costly arms race could block

convergence with Europe and that the only alternative to it is peace in the

neighborhood.

13 and this expenditure manifestly contributes to deficits and debt. To get

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-9

14

Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, and Tunisia.

In addition to Turkey, MEDA aids Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Malta,

15

by FBIS on June 1.

George Papandreou commentary in To Vima Tis Kiriakis, June 1, 1997, p. 14, translated

16

pp. 22-49; also

Simon & Schuster, 1996. Huntington is Professor of Government and Director of the John

Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.

Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, v. 72, summer 1993,The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York,

17

Foreign Affairs, pp. 29-30.

Greece has used its veto power within the EU as a weapon to retaliate against

Turkey for bilateral disputes. Each veto has distanced Greece from its European

partners. For eight years, Greece had blocked the EU’s customs union accord with

Turkey, relenting in 1995 only when the EU agreed to begin membership talks with

Cyprus, which is led by an independent Greek Cypriot government. After the

January 1996 islet crisis, the new Simitis government vetoed both a new EU

assistance program for Mediterranean countries (MEDA) because Turkey was

included and aid to Turkey that was promised as part of the customs union accord.

France, Spain, and Italy conceived of MEDA as a major EU foreign policy initiative.

They and other EU members were angered by Greece’s veto of MEDA, which denied

innocent third countries aid intended to advance European economic and security

goals by contributing to the development and stabilization of those countries.

complaints from its European partners, Greece lifted its veto of MEDA in May 1996.

It has, however, continued to veto the customs union funds. Pangalos has said that

the veto will continue until “Turkish aggressiveness” ends.

As Greece seeks to be less of an outsider within an enlarging EU, it may be

rethinking its policy tools and approaches toward Turkey. It may be considering

options other than using its EU veto for dealing with Turkey. This likely would

require a change in Greek perceptions of Turkish aggressiveness. Alternate Foreign

Minister George Papandreou has elaborated the need for a policy change, arguing that

Greece must present a more positive image of itself to Europe so that it would no

longer be considered obstructionist. Papandreou called on Greece to shape future

Greek-Turkish relations constructively and not rely on vetoes. He urged Turkey and

Greece to seek pragmatic criteria for rapprochement.

14 After15

Finally, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis has had an

exaggerated impact in both Greece and Turkey, although it is not a U.S. policy

statement.

and new conflicts. He drew a cultural fault line across Europe between Western

Christianity on the one hand and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other.

16 Huntington forecast that culture will produce a redivision of the world17

This theoretical division places Greece outside of and in potential opposition to

Western Europe and has outraged Greek academics and politicians. In March 1997,

when Europe’s Christian Democratic party leaders appeared to follow Huntington by

declaring the Turkey could not be part of Europe because it is Muslim, some Greeks

feared that they would be beyond the pale as well. Thus, Pangalos was defending

Greece’s position in Europe when he said that Turkey must be part of Europe. If

Huntington had somehow linked the Aegean neighbors, Greece would use the bond

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-10

18

not advocated Turkey’s EU membership per se.

It should be noted that although Greek officials say Turkey is part of Europe, they have

19

April 11, 1997.

See CRS Report 97-462F, Turkey’s Unfolding Political Crisis, by Carol Migdalovitz,

20

1997.

TRT Television Network report, March 25, 1997, translated by FBIS online, March 16,

to draw European borders widely, encompassing Turkey and ensuring that Greece

remained inside. In order to be in a position to pull Turkey into Europe thus defined,

Greece must improve its bilateral relations with Turkey.

18

Turkey

The Turkish secular elites have just experienced what they consider to have

been a close call with Islamism — a year, from July 1996 through June 1997, in

which the Islamist Refah Party headed the national government.

seek to reinforce Turkey’s modern, European identity through ties with and especially

membership in the European Union. Some in Turkey also are very preoccupied with

the Huntington thesis, noted above, and would like to disprove it by showing that

Turkey is, in fact, European. Turkey’s tortured relations with Greece have been one

of the main barriers to improved Turkish relations with Europe. Europe, therefore,

provides an incentive for some Turks to seek to resolve bilateral disputes with

Greece.

Unlikely as it may seem, the influential Turkish military may be a force for

better relations with Greece. The Turkish General Staff generally takes a moderate

position on Aegean issues and Greek-Turkish relations (perhaps excepting Cyprus)

and wants to improve them. In 1980, after years in which Turkish civilian

governments had blocked the move, a military junta in Ankara delinked the issue of

Greece’s reintegration with NATO from Turkish complaints about the FIR. More

recently, Chief of the General Staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi made the first official

response to Pangalos at a reception at the Greek Embassy in Ankara on March 25.

General Karadayi called on politicians and soldiers to show “common sense” to

resolve problems in the way in which Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Eleftherios

Venizelos, the respective and respected Turkish and Greek leaders, did when they

signed the 1930 Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression, and Arbitration. Karadayi

said that he was “forcing this door (to Greece) open.”

19 The secularists20

Constraints on Change

In Greece and Turkey, domestic politics constrain overall efforts to improve

bilateral relations and specific initiatives to resolve Aegean disputes.

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-11

21

1981-88, 1993-96.

22

1997, carried by FBIS online, July 14, 1997.

Greek PASOK Deputies Criticize Madrid Communique, Athens News Agency, July 11,

23

16 July 1997, translation carried by FBIS online, July 18, 1997.

Greece: Opposition Party Leader Scores Greek-Turkish Accords, Athens ET-1 Television,

Greece

The legacy of Andreas Papandreou, founder of PASOK and twice Prime

Minister,

toward Turkey. The charismatic Papandreou had asserted that Turkey, Greece’s

NATO ally, was the greatest threat to Greece. Papandreou’s dogma is still influential

in Greece and in PASOK, now led by Costas Simitis. PASOK has a majority of 162

out of 300 seats in the Greek parliament and must stay cohesive in order to carry out

its program. When 32 PASOK deputies questioned Greece’s acceptance of the

committee of experts, they signalled the potential political risks of policy innovation.

Some 22 PASOK deputies later charged that, with the Madrid declaration, Greece

was “gradually slipping into choices that result in recognition of Turkish claims,

legalization of Ankara’s expansionist status, and an expiation of its policies.”

smaller opposition parties were more alarmist. Democratic Social Movement leader

Dimitrios Tsovalas, who considers himself an heir to the Papandreist mantle, accused

the government of opening the road to ceding national rights, calling the agreement

“harmful for Greece, for our territorial integrity, and for our national interests.”

21 may impede the Simitis government’s maneuverability in its policy22 Some23

Within the government, Defense Minister Tsokhatzopoulos and Education

Minister Yerasimos Arsenis are known for their hardline views toward Turkey.

Tsokhatzopoulos was a close Papandreou associate and the security requirements of

his Defense portfolio may reinforce his anti-Turkism. Simitis defeated both

Tsokhatzopoulos and Arsenis in the internal PASOK contest to succeed Papandreou

as Prime Minister in January 1996 and Tsokhatzopoulos in a June 1996 vote for party

leader. Although they have publicly supported the policy steps toward Turkey that

Simitis and Pangalos have taken so far, Tsokhatzopoulos and Arsenis may be waiting

for Simitis to stumble in order take internal party and general domestic political

advantage of a failure.

Prime Minister Simitis and Foreign Minister Pangalos cannot get out too far

ahead of their party rivals, parliamentarians, and rank and file. Thus, after party

dissent was voiced, Pangalos offered a restrictive definition of the committees of

experts’ mandate. He and others still resort to anti-Turkish rhetoric. Playing to

dissidents and rivals rhetorically, however, may constrain Simitis’ and Pangalos’

effort to lead and to shape public opinion in support of their policy toward Turkey.

And it is heard in Turkey, where it breeds skepticism about Greece’s sincerity and

acts as a disincentive for improving ties.

Simitis and Pangalos may be able to overcome domestic political constraints.

The 32 dissenters decreased rapidly to 22 and may not be a solid bloc, threatening

foreign policy innovation. Tsokhatzopoulos and Arsenis may be perceived in the

party as losers and lack following to pose a real challenge. Tsokhatzopoulos is as

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-12

much a PASOK loyalist as he was a Papandreou loyalist and may defer to his party

leader’s will. Moreover, New Democracy, the main opposition party, has reacted

reservedly to the Turkish outreach and, therefore, may be inclined to support it. The

support of the internationalist Coalition of the Left for the policy is a given. Finally,

important elements in the Greek press have made common cause with Simitis and

their influence should not be underestimated.

Nevertheless, the Papandreou legacy of antipathy toward Turkey produces other

Greek actions which harm attempts to improve bilateral ties and resolve Aegean

disputes. Greece seeks, and has signed, military agreements with Turkey’s neighbors

which have problematic relations with Turkey, notably Syria and Armenia, adding

to Turkey’s perception of “encirclement.” Greece’s conduct on the Kurdish issue

particularly sours relations. Turks view the 13-year Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)

insurgency as a threat to their territorial integrity. In April 1997, 110 out of 300

Members of the Parliament of Greece proposed to invite PKK leader Abdullah

Ocalan to Athens. The government quickly said that it did not intend to invite him.

Greek MPs have visited PKK camps and Turkey accuses Greece of arming the PKK,

which Athens denies. Turkey has a record of human rights abuses toward Kurds.

But Greece sometimes appears highly selective in its human rights advocacy,

focusing on the Kurds and not other issues such as the treatment of Turks and other

Muslims in Europe. Moreover, Greek championship of Kurdish human rights in the

EU helps deny Ankara dearly sought closer ties with Europe and feeds anti-Greek

sentiment in Turkey.

Finally, there is a strong Cyprus lobby in Athens opposed to any initiatives that

would produce a Greek-Turkish reconciliation before a Cyprus settlement, which

traditionally has been a Greek precondition for a rapprochement. The U.N. has

resumed the Cyprus negotiations, but the outlook for a solution is uncertain or

gloomy. Cyprus thus could stymie Aegean peacemaking.

Turkey

Ankara now has its third government since an inconclusive national election in

December 1995, and an early election may be held in 1998. This governmental

instability may affect relations with Greece as politicians exploit foreign policy for

domestic consumption and leave their weak coalition little room for compromise.

The Islamist-led government that was in office through June 1997 was directed

toward the East and selected Muslim countries. It paid almost no attention to Greece

because its rank and file had little, if any, interest. The current seemingly

mismatched coalition of right and left is led by Mesut Yilmaz, who made the

overture to Greece in March 1996 after the Imia/Kardak crisis. However, Deputy

Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit has emerged as the government’s main foreign policy

spokesman, and his party controls the Foreign Ministry and the State Ministry in

charge of Cyprus policy. Ecevit was Prime Minister in 1974, when Turkey

intervened in/invaded Cyprus and remains proud of what he accomplished then.

Ecevit’s nationalism on Cyprus could interfere with the Aegean opening. Yilmaz

depends on Ecevit’s party to stay in power and has little ability or perhaps wish to

constrain him. Shortly after taking power this time, Ecevit initiated a move toward

partial “integration” of (Turkish) northern Cyprus with Turkey as a response to the

EU’s announcement of membership talks with the (Greek) Cypriot government.

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-13

24

President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash on July 9 in New

York and in Switzerland on August 9. Heightened activity is expected after the February

1998 Cypriot presidential election. See, CRS Issue Brief 89140, cited above.

For the first time in over 3 years, the U.N. convened direct talks between (Greek) Cypriot

25

carried by FBIS, July 8, 1997.

Yilmaz Presents Government Program, TRT Television Network, July 7, 1987, translation

As noted, a resolution of the Cyprus issue has been a traditional Greek

precondition for improved ties with Turkey. Athens and the Greek media in

particular reacted strongly to Ecevit’s return to power and his Cyprus policy. Ecevit

may contribute to a disruption of the renewed U.N. effort to obtain a Cyprus

settlement

officials may not be able to persist in their outreach to Turkey if Ecevit’s impact is

not mitigated.

Ecevit may have another, more indirect, impact on Greek-Turkish relations.

With him in the government, better ties with Europe may not be as strong an

incentive for improving relations with Greece. Although Prime Minister Yilmaz has

said that speeding up efforts toward full membership in the EU is a priority foreign

policy aim of the government,

Turkey and some want to reject Europe in response. Ecevit and others call for the

customs union accord to be reviewed because Europe has failed to live up to its (aid)

commitments and because the customs union has aggravated Turkey’s trade

imbalance with Europe and harmed Turkish businesses. Turks know that Greece’s

veto is the impediment to aid. On the other hand, those still lured to Europe perceive

Greece’s policy of “veto” of Turkey’s relations with Europe as an obstacle to their

Western identity, potentially reinforcing support for Islamists. They may not be

disposed to look benevolently on improving ties to Greece.

Finally, Turkey looms larger in Greek thinking than vice versa. The particular

Aegean initiatives have not produced a reaction in Turkey comparable to that in

Greece. Despite Turkey’s agreeing to the Madrid declaration, there appears to be no

thinking in Ankara on the details of Aegean issues or bilateral Turkish-Greek

relations comparable to that of Pangalos in Athens. Political leaders are preoccupied

domestically with Islamism and government turnovers, and the foreign policy

establishment revises views slowly. Although General Karadayi made positive

comments in March, the military is engrossed in fighting what it refers to as the two

main threats to Turkish national security — Islamism and (Kurdish) separatism. It

is not clear if it will have a sustained and involved interest in engaging itself actively

on behalf of an Aegean resolution. Two parties are required to create a new

paradigm to govern bilateral relations and Turkey does not appear to be fully

engaged.

24 and, thereby, set back Turkish-Greek relations on other fronts. Greek25 many Turks perceive Europe as repeatedly rejecting

U.S. Policy

The United States wants to preserve stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, a

region bordered by conflict zones. It also wants to prevent NATO from being

embroiled in local controversies. In order to achieve these goals, the United States

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-14

26

Transcript, Reuters, April 9, 1996.

has tried to remain neutral in and worked to resolve disputes between its two NATO

allies, Greece and Turkey. Yet neutrality has not always been appreciated. Greeks

maintain that an equidistant U.S. stance benefits Turkey and ignores what they

believe is the right (Greek) position on Aegean issues. Greece’s view of the regional

power balance, with Turkey as the more powerful player, necessitates that it

seek/demand third party or international intervention to level the scales or to weigh

them in Greece’s favor. U.S. neutrality fails to fulfill that need. On the other hand,

Turkey, as the larger power, assumes it can obtain a more favorable outcome from

negotiations solely between the two governments and usually calls for dialogue.

Turks believe that they are the more important regional ally of the United States,

adjacent to the Middle East and the Caucasus. They do not criticize U.S. neutrality,

and generally appreciate and expect U.S. services in mediating controversies with

Greece and in moderating their effect on Turkey’s relations with Europe because the

United States supports Turkey’s entry into the European Union.

Neutrality evidently interfered with U.S.-Greek relations after the Imia/Kardak

crisis, when then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard

Holbrooke had planned to travel to Greece and Turkey to help them achieve a more

permanent end to tensions in the Aegean. He did not make the trip. Holbrooke had

brokered a resolution to the crisis that appeared to restore the prior balance in the

Aegean. But many in Greece perceived it differently. They saw the crisis as one of

Turkey questioning long-established territorial rights and the status quo in the

Aegean. Holbrooke had failed to address the crisis in these terms and instead

concentrated on eliminating the immediate threat of war. Greeks did not view his

achievement on Imia/Kardak favorably. The newly established government in

Athens that had accepted the U.S. resolution was weakened temporarily. It did not

have sufficient political capital to expend at the time on a meeting with Holbrooke

and diplomatically found his trip schedule inconvenient. Ankara stood ready to

welcome Holbrooke and regretted that the visit was canceled.

Although no U.S. initiative on Aegean issues was undertaken in 1996, the

brinkmanship of Imia/Kardak was not forgotten. The islet crisis had focused U.S.

attention on the tinderbox of Greek-Turkish relations. During Prime Minister

Simitis’ April 9, 1996, visit to White House, President Clinton said

I hope the United States can be helpful in resolving some of the problems

in the Aegean.... We believe that all these issues should be resolved

without the use of force, without the threat of force, with everyone

agreeing to abide by international agreements and to respect the territorial

integrity of other countries.... We favor the resolution (of the Imia

situation) by referring the matter to the ICJ or some other international

arbitration panel.

26

In this statement, the President seemed to accept Greece’s perspective on the Aegean

in deference to his visitor and to reclaim Greece’s recognition of the United States

as a bona fide intermediary.

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-15

27

1996, translated by FBIS online, December 1, 1996.

U.S. Ambassador Interviewed on Greek-Turkish Issues, I Kathimerini, November 27,

28

Migdalovitz, updated regularly.

See CRS Issue Brief 86065, Greece and Turkey: Current Foreign Aid Issues, by Carol

The Administration has worked to resolve Greek-Turkish differences through

NATO and by itself, with Defense Department and the State Department officials

meeting often with Greek and Turkish counterparts in the region and in Washington.

The Defense Department supports the NATO Secretary General’s confidencebuilding

measures. The State Department champions these measures and more. U.S.

Ambassador to Greece Thomas Niles declared that the United States believes that the

1988 Papoulias-Yilmaz agreement must be fully implemented and that it is desirable

to proceed beyond it.

obtained Greek and Turkish agreement to the Madrid declaration.

The State Department views Madrid as an important first step. It is encouraging

the parties to apply the Madrid principles in the resolution of their various disputes

and to acknowledge the need for trade-offs. The first trade-off may involve Turkey

taking the Imia/Kardak controversy to the World Court in exchange for Greece lifting

its veto on European Union customs union aid. But more work needs to be done. As

is said with regard to other international disputes in which Washington attempts to

obtain a settlement, the United States cannot want a resolution more than the parties

themselves.

As Aegean issues are addressed, the United States may have to recuse itself

from the airspace controversy, an irritant in Greek-U.S. relations. Greek journalists

persistently bait State Department briefers to restate U.S. policy, which conforms to

international practice. Each restatement prompts annoyed official reactions from

Athens. This matter will continue to fester because the territorial sea-airspace

incongruity is unlikely to be resolved. This U.S.-Greek policy dispute is otherwise

not a regular subject of official exchanges and highlights the negative impact the

media can have on U.S.-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations. Greek and Turkish

media are foreign policy actors producing unexpected consequences.

Congress has not weighed in on recent developments. Since the 1970s, foreign

aid legislation has applied a “balance of forces” policy to Greece and Turkey. It tilts

toward Greece, which many Members view as facing a demographically and

militarily superior adversary in Turkey.

not passed, after the Imia/Kardak crisis mirrored Athens’ position.

27 Finally, the State Department assiduously sought and28 Congressional resolutions proposed, but

Prospects

History prompts circumspection about the prospects for a resolution of Aegean

disputes and for a Greek-Turkish reconciliation. Other efforts have not been

successful. The 1987 crisis over the continental shelf produced the evocative “Spirit

of Davos,” Switzerland, where Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers met and began a

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-16

29

July 23, 1997.

Pangalos interview, Ta Nea, July 21, 1007, pp. 10-11, translation carried by FBIS online,

30

August 11, 1997, p. 38.

Interview: A Tremendous Step, What Greece’s Simitis wants from Turkey, Newsweek,

31

Interview: We have Done a Lot — New to the Job, Yilmaz has his own demands,

Newsweek

, August 11, 1997, p. 39.

short-lived rapprochement in 1988 that foundered on the shoals of domestic politics.

Nonetheless, the overall prospects for improved Greek-Turkish relations and for

a resolution of some bilateral Aegean issues may be better today than they have been

in a decade and may justify some cautious optimism. The major contributing factor

to such an assessment is the strong domestic position and motivation of the Athens

government, which has made sweeping, unprecedented policy statements on Greek-

Turkish issues. For example, Pangalos said that Greece accepts that “Turkey has

vital interests in Aegean.”

Cyprus precondition to better relations with Turkey. Foreign Minister Pangalos

distinguished Cyprus as an international issue from the Aegean as a national issue,

and Prime Minister Simitis asserted outright that Greek-Turkish relations and the

Cyprus question are not connected.

29 The Simitis government also may be willing to lift the30

Further, as noted above (p. 7), Greek officials had laid out three conditions for

improved bilateral relations. Turkey met two of them with the Madrid declaration.

The only remaining condition concerns Court jurisdiction over the islet dispute.

Pangalos has eased the way for compliance by saying that all Turkey has to do is say

that it is willing to go to the World Court. For their part, the Turks had wanted direct

negotiations to precede recourse to the Court. Prime Minister Yilmaz implied that

requirement may be met by a meeting of committees of experts when he observed

that the committees can lead Turkey to the Court.

Court, thereby recognizing Greece’s need for an international forum, Greece would

have no justification for not lifting lift its veto on European Union customs union aid

to Turkey. In a possibly upbeat scenario, lifting of the veto would do much to

assuage hard feelings toward Greece in Turkey.

The outlook for the resolution of the different Aegean issues varies.

31 If Turkey agrees to go to the

!

unintended. Greece and Turkey blundered into the Imia/Kardak crisis, which

some consider a media creation that got out of hand. Turkey subsequently

could not find a face-saving way to back down from the notion of “grey areas”

and may have made it worse. The two sides acceptance of the status quo in

Madrid underscores that their lack of interest in perpetuating the unsettling

byproducts of the islet controversy. The separate issue of militarized islands,

however, is unlikely to be resolved because Turkey will not move or change

its 4th Army — at least until given long-term evidence of Greece’s friendship.

The islet dispute may be open to resolution because its onset was largely

!

Greece maintains that it is a legal question to be resolved by the International

Of the older Aegean disputes, the continental shelf may be ripe for settlement.

http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-97-799

CRS-17

Court of Justice. Turkey contends that it is also an economic, political, and

strategic dispute, requiring a political settlement. Yet, Turkey has not

categorically rejected an appeal to the Court — again after bilateral

negotiations. In the past decade, expectations of oil or other mineral

discoveries in the continental shelf appear to have lowered, perhaps

diminishing the value of the dispute. As a result, the issue may be more

soluble, with both parties taking it to the Court after some preliminary talks

that would not be called a dialogue, a word connoting unacceptable

compromise and, therefore, anathema to some Greeks.

!

allowed to be less of an issue. The modus vivendi involves Greece retaining

the right to 12-nautical-miles of sea, but continuing not to exercise the right.

As long as it does not exercise the right (unilateral move), Turkey will control

its rhetoric and stop threatening war.

With regard to the territorial sea, Madrid appeared to signal that it may be

!

rights disconnected from territorial sea rights and interprets FIR in a sovereign

manner.

The prospects for a solution for all or any of the Aegean issues depend on the

governments in Athens and Ankara. The Simitis government is a stable, one-party

administration that probably will serve out its full four years. It is strongly motivated

and may persist in its outreach to Ankara for some time, weathering ups and downs

unless Turkish actions shut it out. Greece’s motivations mostly are externally driven,

and it needs to work on creating a solid domestic consensus for a foreign policy

shift toward Turkey. The Yilmaz coalition government was founded in part on a

promise to hold early elections. It has multiple political components and must reach

compromises among them. It may prove tempting for some politicians to exploit

foreign policy issues for domestic advantage or, as in the case of Ecevit, for

principles unleavened by pragmatism. Moreover, whether the government and its

anticipated successors will work with the foreign policy establishment on a

consistent, creative, and responsive approach to a different Greece is yet to be seen.

This context renders a positive outcome from present opportunities unpredictable.

The airspace controversy is likely to linger as long as Greece claims air space